Abstract. This paper revisits a particular norm of behaviour underlying the well known model of kinked demand. We show that under some standard regularity conditions this norm of behaviour sustains the e¢ cient outcome in all symmetric games.
Introduction
This paper focusses on the postulated behaviour of …rms competing in imperfect competitive markets, …rst theorized in the late 30s by a number of well known economists (Robinson (1933) , Sweezy (1939) ), and best known as the "kinked demand model". This basically predicts an asymmetric behaviour of …rms in response to a price change, each expecting its rivals to be more reactive in matching its price cuts than its price increases. This prediction has been empirically tested by Hall and Hitch (1939) and later by Bhaskar et al. (1991) , extensively criticized as not grounded in rational behaviour by Stigler (1947) , Domberger (1979) , Reid (1981) and more recently analyzed in a dynamic settings by Marschak and Selten (1978) , Maskin and Tirole (1988) and Bhaskar (1988) .
In this paper we add to this debate by showing that this behavioural rule possesses strong stability properties and, therefore, may sustain …rms' collusion. In particular, in a symmetric and monotone market, we prove that, if every …rm adopts and expects a simple kinked demand social norm of behaviour (KSN), the symmetric collusive outcome (i.e. monopoly pricing) constitutes an equilibrium. We show that this result is rather robust and can be extended to all n-person symmetric strategic form games: a KSN always makes the symmetric e¢ cient strategy pro…le (the one maximizing the sum of all players'utility) stable. Moreover, we show that under some additional standard assumptions on players'playo¤ functions, a slightly stronger norm of behaviour (implicitly implying a norm of reciprocity) makes the e¢ cient outcome the only stable outcome of the game.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces a gametheoretic setting. Section 3 concludes.
A General Setting
We …rst introduce a class of games in which players are endowed with the same strategy space and perceive symmetrically all strategy pro…les of the game. Moreover, players'payo¤s possess a monotonicity property with respect to their opponents'choices. Although very speci…c, this setting still covers many well known economic applications (as Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly, public goods games and many others). We denote a monotone symmetric n-player game in strategic form as a triple G = N; (X i ; u i ) i2N , in which N = f1; :::; i; :::; ng is the …nite set of players, X i is player i's strategy set and u i : X N ! R + is player i's payo¤ function, where X N = X 1 ::: X n denotes the Cartesian product of players' strategy sets. We assume that each strategy set is partially ordered by the relation . We assume the following. P.1 (Symmetry) X i = X for each i 2 N . Moreover, for every i 2 N , x 2 X N and any permutation of players' indexes (N ) :
P.2 (Monotone Spillovers) For every i; j 2 N with j 6 = i, we have either:
where x j = (x 1 ; ::; x j 1 ; x j+1 ; ::; x n ).
We will talk of positive spillovers (PS) when (2.2) holds and of negative spillovers (NS) when (2.3) holds. A strategy pro…le x is symmetric if it prescribes the same strategy to all players. A Pareto Optimum (PO) for G is a strategy pro…le x o such that there exists no alternative pro…le which is preferred by all players and is strictly preferred by at least one player. A Pareto E¢ cient (PE) pro…le x e maximizes the sum of payo¤s of all players in N .
We now introduce the notion of a generic social norm of behaviour.
1 Definition 1. (Social norm of behaviour). We say that the social norm of behaviour : X 7 ! X n 1 is active in G if every player i 2 N deviating from a given pro…le of strategies x 2 X N by means of the alternative strategy
Finally, let us introduce a general de…nition of stability of a strategy pro…le in our game G; under any arbitrary social norm of behaviour.
Definition 2. A strategy pro…le x 2 X N is stable under the social norm if there exists no i 2 N and x 0 i 2 X i such that
We are interested in the Kinked Social Norm (KSN) of behaviour. The original idea of the kinked demand model (Robinson 1936 , Sweezy 1939 ) was based on the assumption that …rms competing in a common market would react to changes in rivals' prices in an asymmetric manner. Speci…cally, when a …rm raises its price it expects the other …rms to raise their price comparatively less (under-reaction); when a …rm lowers its price, conversely, it expects the others to reduce even more their price (over-reaction). If …rms set quantities instead of prices the above norm of behaviour would require that …rms expect their rival to over-react when increasing their quantity and under-react when decreasing their quantity. In general, this social norm can be de…ned in abstract terms in the way that follows. 
negative spillovers(NS).
Note that, according to the de…nition above, the KSN imposes to all agents in N n fig to play a strategy lower (greater) or equal than the strategy played by the deviating player i under positive (negative) spillovers. Behind the KSN of behaviour there is no presumption of rational behaviour and players' reactions may easily not correspond to their best reply mappings (see below for a brief digression on this point).
We are now ready to present the main result of the paper. 
Using PS and the fact that
and therefore, by P1,
which contradicts the e¢ ciency of x e . Assume now that under negative spillovers (NS) there exists a player i 2 N with a x 0 i 2 X i such that (2.9)
By NS and the fact that k j (x 0 i ) x 0 i it must be that (2.10)
which, again, leads to a contradiction.
Proposition 1 simply tells us that if the expected behaviour of players in the event of a deviation from an e¢ cient strategy pro…le is described by the kinked social norm, then every such e¢ cient pro…le, if reached, is stable. In terms of imperfect competition, the expected kinked behaviour of …rms makes collusion a stable outcome.
The example below makes clear that stable ine¢ cient (and asymmetric) outcomes cannot be ruled out without adding more structure to the above analysis. In this game we assume that players' strategy can be ordered and, e.g., A B C, therefore the game respects both P.1 and P.2, with positive spillovers (PS). In this game, (A; A) ; the PE strategy pro…le, is obviously stable under KSN. If, say player 1 deviates playing B, KSN implies k 2 (B) = fB; Cg and player 1 ends up with a lower payo¤ than before, since u 1 (A; A) > u 1 (B; B) > u 1 (B; C). By symmetry, the same happens to player 2. However, asymmetric ine¢ cient strategy pro…les as (B; A), (A; B), (C; A) and (A; C) are also stable under KSN, given that u 1 (B; A) > u 1 (A; B) > u 1 (A; C) and u 1 (C; A) > u 1 (B; B) > u 1 (B; C) and the same for player 2.
To strengthen the result of proposition 1 and rule out ine¢ cient stable outcomes, we add the following assumptions on the structure of G.
P3. Each player's strategy set is a compact and convex subset of the set of real numbers.
P4. Each player i's payo¤ function u(x) is continuous in x and strictly quasiconcave in x i .
Under these additional conditions, Lemma 1 in the appendix shows that there is a unique Pareto E¢ cient strategy pro…le of G, and it is symmetric. In order to rule out all ine¢ cient stable outcomes, we need to re…ne the social norm employed in proposition 1. Intuitively, the kinked norm imposes an upper bound on the pro…tability of deviations, and was therefore useful to show that e¢ cient pro…les are stable. In order to rule out the stability of ine¢ cient pro…les, we need to impose a lower bound on the pro…tability of deviations. We do so by imposing a "symmetric" social norm of behaviour, which essentially prescribes players to mimic the strategy adopted by a deviator.
Definition 4. (Symmetric Social
Norm) The Symmetric Social Norm of behaviour (SSN) s is described as follows: for each i 2 N , and x 0 i :
We are now ready to prove the next proposition.
Proposition 2. Let the game G satisfy conditions P1-P4. Then, under the Symmetric Social Norm of behaviour the (symmetric) Pareto e¢ cient pro…le x e 2 X N is the unique stable strategy pro…le.
Proof. Consider …rst the e¢ cient pro…le x e , which, by Lemma 1, must be symmetric. Suppose player i has a pro…table deviation x 0 i . Using the Symmetric Social Norm (SSN), the expected payo¤ for i would be u i (x 0 i ; :::; x 0 i ). 
which contradicts the e¢ ciency of x e . We next show that all ine¢ cient pro…les are not stable. The argument for ine¢ cient symmetric pro…les is trivial: thanks to the Symmetric Social Norm (SSN), it is enough for any player i to switch to the e¢ cient pro…le to improve upon any ine¢ cient strategy pro…le. Consider then an asymmetric pro…le x 0 . Let i be one player such that u i (x 0 ) < u i (x e ) (obviously, such a player must exist by e¢ ciency of x e and ine¢ ciency of x 0 ). By continuity of payo¤s, there exists some strategy x i close enough to x e i such that
Since the pro…le ( x i ; :::; x i ) can be induced by player i thanks to SSN, player i has a pro…table deviation, and the result follows.
Finally, a relevant question to raise is whether the behaviour predicted by the model of kinked demand can in general be considered rational. About this issue, it can be shown that in all symmetric supermodular games in which strategy sets are ordered, the behaviour postulated by the kinked demand model is fully compatible with players'rationality. The same cannot be said when games are submodular, i.e. when players'actions are strategic substitutes and their best responses negatively sloped.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have shown that, for all symmetric and monotone strategic form games, the behaviour postulated by the classical model of kinked demand possesses strong stability properties. Such a result holds even stronger when players expect a fully symmetric norm of behaviour by all remaining players in the event of an individual deviation. In this case, the perfectly cooperative (collusive) outcome becomes the only stable outcome of the game, As a consequence, …rms may implicitly adopt such norms of behaviour in order to implement tacit collusion and sustain perfectly collusive outcome in imperfectly competitive markets.
Appendix
Lemma 1. Let the game G satisfy conditions P1-P4. Then, there is a unique strategy pro…le x e = arg max x2X N P i2N u i (x) and it is such that, x e 1 = x e 2 = ::: = x e n .
Proof. Compactness of each X i implies compactness of X N : Continuity of each player's payo¤ u i (x) on x implies the continuity of the social payo¤ function u N = P i2N u i (x). Existence of an e¢ cient pro…le (PE) x e 2 X N directly follows from Weiestrass theorem.We …rst prove that a PE strategy pro…le is symmetric.
Suppose x e i 6 = x e j for some i; j 2 N: By symmetry we can derive from x e a new vector x 0 by permuting the strategies of players i and j such that and hence, by the strict quasiconcavity of all u i (x); for all 2 (0; 1) we have that:
Since, by the convexity of X; the strategy vector ( x 0 + (1 )x e ) 2 X N ; we obtain a contradiction. Finally, by the strict quasiconcavity of both individual and social payo¤s in each player's strategy, the e¢ cient pro…le x e can be easily proved to be unique.
